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WORK PRODUCT REJECTED:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR ALLEN
Elizabeth G. Thornburg*
p ROFESSOR Ronald J. Allen's comments on my article' provide a
welcome opportunity to clarify and expand my argument that the
limited claims made by economists in favor of work product immu-
nity do not justify the doctrine's continued existence. His response
invites me to "reconstitute [the] arguments against work product to
dispose of the economic justification for the doctrine."' 2 While I
believe that the arguments presented in the original article already
address the ex ante, marginal aspects of the economic argument, this
reply will address the issue more specifically.
My disagreements with Professor Allen come in three areas. First,
I doubt that the marginal increase in incentive to investigate is signifi-
cant in most cases, although I readily concede that it can exist.
Unfortunately, the cases in which there is most likely to be further
investigation are those in which it is least likely to lead to more accu-
rate outcomes. Second, positing a marginal increase merely begins
the inquiry. Work product immunity can be justified only if the bene-
fits of increased investigation outweigh the costs to litigants and to the
judicial system. Finally, I do not expect the elimination of work prod-
uct immunity to eliminate tactical behavior by attorneys during dis-
covery. Rather, the elimination of work product immunity would
shift regulation (court control) of that behavior away from arguments
about anticipation of litigation, agency status, or other doctrinal work
product issues, and instead focus directly on the real underlying
problems of cost, timing, and harassment.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
I Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1515 (1991).
2 Ronald J. Allen, Work Product Revisited: A Comment on Rethinking Work Product, 78
Va. L. Rev. 949, 949 (1992).
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I. THE LAWYER'S DILEMMA: DECIDING WHETHER TO
INVESTIGATE UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY
As Professor Allen points out, a lawyer deciding whether to investi-
gate further faces uncertainty. It is important to identify separately
the variables that she must factor into this decision. In making her
decision, the lawyer must estimate, for each variable, the probabilities
of various possible outcomes.
A. Cost of Investigation
From an ex ante perspective, the lawyer will not know the cost, in
terms of time and money, of investigating. She will, however, based
on experience, be able to estimate the cost. I will call this variable
Expected Cost to Investigate (A).
B. Benefit of Investigation
Again from an ex ante perspective, the lawyer will not know the
extent to which acquiring the information sought through further
investigation will prove helpful. The potential value will range from
zero (for totally useless information) to a high value (for information
very helpful to the lawyer's case). Because lawyers can better prepare
their own cases when they are aware of bad as well as good facts, even
information helpful to the opponent will have value. While the facts
themselves may be harmful to the investigating party's case, learning
the facts has positive value. Although the lawyer will not know the
value of information to be uncovered before investigating, she can
estimate, based on the probabilities of the various potential outcomes,
the value of the information sought. The lawyer's degree of uncer-
tainty will also affect the value she places on the investigation. I will
call this variable Expected Value of Investigation (X).
C. Need to Reveal Information to Opponent
Whether the results of trial preparation will have to be disclosed to
the opponent is also uncertain ex ante under the present system. The
likelihood of compelled disclosure varies with both the work product
doctrine in the relevant jurisdiction and the facts of the case. Thus,
application of the existing work product protection to any informa-
tion is frequently unpredictable. First, tangible items memorializing
the investigation (e.g., notes, tape recordings, videos) will be protected
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from disclosure only if the court concludes that the investigator was
the right kind of agent and that the investigation was done in "antici-
pation of litigation."' Second, the work product immunity is only a
qualified one. A party may have to divulge work product if a court
later finds that the opponent has a substantial need for it and cannot
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means
without undue hardship.4 Third, the duration of work product
immunity is uncertain. Although protected in a particular case, a
court in a later, similar lawsuit may require disclosure of work prod-
uct material.5 Even with work product immunity, therefore, the law-
yer cannot be certain before investigating that the results of the
investigation will be protected. Fourth, work product immunity, in
theory, does not protect the information learned through pretrial
investigation. Work product immunity protects a party from having
to respond to a discovery request like "produce your notes from inter-
viewing Witness Jones." It does not, however, protect a party from
having to provide its opponent with the information learned from
Witness Jones if the opponent correctly words the request.6 For
example, if the lawyer learned through questioning Witness Jones that
the sky is blue, she would have to answer an interrogatory asking
"what color is the sky?" even though she learned the information
through trial preparation.
The lawyer will estimate the probability of required disclosure.
This variable can be characterized as either a cost or as a benefit.7
The ability to conduct the investigation without the need to divulge its
results could be treated as an additional benefit to the investigating
party. Alternatively, the probability of required disclosure can be
thought of as an increased cost of the investigation. Because Profes-
3 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Thornburg, supra note 1, at 1528-29.
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
5 See generally D. Christopher Wells, The Attorney Work-Product Doctrine and Carry-
Over Immunity: An Assessment of Their Justifications, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 675 (1986)
(considering whether work product material ought ever to be protected in later lawsuits).
6 See Thornburg, supra note 1, at 1528.
7 This is the way in which I discuss the issue in the body of my article. See id. at 1545-50. I
believe, however, that the results of the analysis are the same whether the secrecy and expense
issues are treated as benefits (of being able to keep secrets and increase opponent's cost) or as




sor Allen discusses the problem in terms of cost,' I will call this varia-
ble Expected Cost of Divulging Information (B).
D. Combining the Variables: Can Work Product Immunity Create
a Marginal Increase in Trial Preparation?
Putting all of these variables together, the lawyer will decide to
investigate further if the Expected Value of Investigation exceeds the
Expected Cost to Investigate plus the Expected Cost of Divulging
Information [X > A + B]. If the existence of work product immu-
nity decreases B, then work product immunity may increase the
number of occasions on which expected value exceeds expected cost,
and we may achieve Professor Allen's marginal increase in trial prep-
aration. In terms of the equation, the increase will occur only when X
is greater than A, but not greater than A + B. While I do not deny
that this will ever happen, I doubt that it will happen often or that it
will produce significant information.
1. The Expected Value of Investigation
For the reasons set out at greater length in my article,9 for investi-
gations with a possibility of producing useful information, the value of
X will be quite high relative to A or B, and to A and B. Even when
the expected cost of divulging information (B) is included as a cost
item, the lawyer will still deem the expected value of the information
to exceed the expected cost and will undertake the investigation.
Uncertainty about the nature of the information that investigation
will reveal does not necessarily decrease this value (X). Unless the
lawyer is fairly confident that she already possesses all relevant infor-
mation, or that the potential investigation would yield only margin-
ally useful or cumulative information, she is likely to place a high
value on X and choose to investigate. Also, Professor Allen's model
assumes a risk-neutral rather than a risk-averse lawyer. In fact, many
trial lawyers are risk averse and will choose the possibility of expected
costs exceeding expected benefits because they fear an adverse out-
come, even when such an outcome is relatively unlikely. The Anglo-
American trial system, which gives litigants only a single chance to
present evidence to the decisionmaker, feeds the fear. In the face of
8 Allen, supra note 2, at 950.
9 See Thornburg, supra note 1, at 1526-30.
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this fear, the decision whether to investigate further is unlikely to be
affected by changes in work product rules, particularly when the cost
of investigating is a cost to the client.
2. Elasticity of Demand
Professor Allen's theory assumes a very elastic demand for trial
preparation activity: any increase in cost will result in a decrease in
investigation. For most trial preparation, however, demand for inves-
tigation is relatively inelastic: even if the price goes up, the quantity
demanded remains the same. To use a variant on Professor Allen's
spaghetti analogy, the demand for trial preparation resembles the
demand for breads; it is not a demand for a single product. For basic
bread, the quantity demanded remains constant even with increases in
price. People must eat; litigants want to win their cases. If the price
of croissants increases, however, people will buy fewer. Conceivably,
some trial preparation is like croissants, but thejbulk of it is more like
basic bread. Demand for trial preparation will in most cases be rela-
tively insensitive to increases in cost related to the loss of work prod-
uct immunity.
Although inelastic, the demand is not limitless. Bread, as used
here, is necessary to sustain life. Investigation is only necessary to
win a lawsuit. People will buy bread, no matter what the cost, until
they run out of money. Litigants, however, "run out of money" to
spend on a lawsuit when the expected cost 0 of litigation equals the
expected value" of the litigation. The existence of an outer limit,
however, does not change the nature of the demand before the limit is
reached.
10 When estimating "cost" in this sense, I suspect that litigants are concerned with actual
out-of-pocket costs without adding the intangible cost of providing information to an opponent
more cheaply.
In Litigants may be motivated by factors other than, or in addition to, the economic value of
the lawsuit, such as a desire for vindication, revenge, or the establishment of certain principles.
Thus, in using the phrase "expected value of the lawsuit," I include these less tangible factors
as well as the estimated stakes in dollars. Also, litigants involved in multiple related lawsuits
can calculate costs and benefits for the entire lawsuit group and may choose to spend more on
investigation than a particular lawsuit is worth if the value of investigation exceeds the cost of
investigation for the entire group of related suits.
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3. Expected Cost of Divulging Information: Work Product vs.
No Work Product
There is another reason that the marginal impact of work product
immunity is small: the effective protection provided by the work
product doctrine is already limited. Here it is important to distin-
guish between work product doctrine in theory and work product
doctrine in operation.
a. Theory: We Have No Secrets
Work product immunity protects trial preparation activity and its
products. As a qualified privilege, it does not always protect trial
preparation materials, and in theory it never protects the information
learned through trial preparation. Therefore, the change in Expected
Cost of Divulging Information from current work product doctrine to
a lack of work product immunity would be a small one. Because
information must be disclosed (if correctly requested) an attorney's
ability to keep information from an opponent does not change. Once
bad facts are learned, they must be disclosed either with or without
work product immunity.
The elimination of work product immunity might lead to a modest
increase in the Expected Cost of Divulging Information (based on a
decrease in the opponent's cost of securing the information). Again,
however, this difference would be insignificant. In neither system
must the opponent start from scratch and investigate independently.
The difference lies in the skill required of opposing counsel. Without
work product immunity, drafting discovery requests would be simpler
and therefore less expensive in terms of attorney time (e.g., "Please
produce your investigative file.") 12 With work product immunity, the
opponent's lawyer must hit upon the correct question before the infor-
mation will be divulged. The difference in cost, then, is the difference
between an easy process and a harder process, between a few produc-
tion requests and a greater number of interrogatories or depositions.
This, rather than the much larger difference in costs between acquir-
ing information from an opponent and doing an independent investi-
12 Of course, rules unrelated to work product can still complicate the process. For example,
the request noted above could be said to be "too broad" and the discovering party required to
break the request down into more specific categories.
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gation, is the theoretical difference in cost between systems with and
without work product immunity.
b. Reality: Secrets and Unequal Resources
Despite the theory that work product immunity hides nothing, in
practice the doctrine can result in one party being deprived of infor-
mation.13 Opposing counsel, like Groucho's contestants on "You Bet
Your Life," may never manage to say the magic word and win the
prize. The information learned through trial preparation may remain
available only to the investigating lawyer. This means that eliminat-
ing work product immunity would increase the Expected Cost of
Divulging Information, but in a manner contrary to theory and detri-
mental to the operation of the judicial system.14
When the opponent finds herself unable to acquire information
through discovery, she faces the need to do her own investigation.
She in turn must estimate the expected cost of investigation and bal-
ance it against the expected value of investigation. Having introduced
an additional party, we introduce an additional variable-differences
in party resources. Even if the expected dollar cost to investigate is
the same for both parties, 5 its impact may vary. One party may eas-
ily afford the cost, while another cannot, or can only at some sacrifice.
One party may have to assess the cost in the context of a single law-
suit while another may be able to spread the cost over multiple,
related lawsuits. As the expected value of the information becomes
more peripheral or the effective cost higher, a party with more limited
resources is increasingly likely to choose to go forward without infor-
mation held by its opponent. In A. T. &T. v. M.C., this factor may be
insignificant. In John Doe v. General Motors, however, work product
immunity may allow significant differences in access to information.
In cases where the impact of unequal resources can be expected to
result in unequal information, then, eliminating work product immu-
nity would increase the estimated cost of divulging information. This
increase should not exist in theory, but probably does exist in
practice.
13 See Thornburg, supra note 7, at 1551-55.
14 Id.




Professor Allen is right. There may be cases in which work prod-
uct immunity can lead to a marginal increase in trial preparation.
This marginal increase has costs, both internal and external, which
cannot be ignored.
II. THE MARGINAL INCREASE COMPARED TO ITS COST
So far, I have established that work product immunity may on
occasion result in a marginal increase in trial preparation, especially
in cases involving peripheral information or differences in party
resources. Work product immunity, however, must be analyzed in
terms of its effect on the judicial system, not merely in terms of its
impact on a party's trial strategy. The overall benefit from a marginal
increase in trial preparation must exceed its overall costs.
A. Benefit
In order to be of benefit in this larger sense, the marginal increase
must benefit the judicial system as well as the individual litigant. This
benefit, however, is likely to be small. Any additional information
gained may not influence the decisionmaker or, indeed, may never
reach it. As discussed above, the marginal increase in investigation
will most likely occur when the expected value of the information is
small, i.e., for information only slightly useful in the lawsuit, or when
resource differences allow facts to be hidden. Even assuming that the
additional information is presented to the trier of fact, it may have no
effect on the outcome of the case. Alternatively, the additional infor-
mation may not be presented to the trier of fact. It may be that the
information is irrelevant. Or, in the situation of unequal party
resources, the information learned in the investigation may be a "bad"
fact which the investigating party succeeds in hiding from her oppo-
nent. If the information gained from the increased investigation does
not reach or does not influence the trier of fact, it does not benefit the
trial process.
B. Cost
The small potential increase in benefit generated by additional
investigation must be balanced against its cost. As discussed at length
in my article, the existence of work product immunity results in
increased costs to the parties: increased cost of trial preparation
(including the cost of work product disputes), and cost of undiscov-
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ered information.1 6 Work product immunity also results in systemic
costs: waste of additional resources on trial preparation, transaction
costs of deciding work product disputes, and harm to the general
deterrence function of litigation caused by the information imbalance
fostered by the work product doctrine."7 From the standpoint of the
judicial system as a whole, then, the costs of work product immunity
far exceed its benefits.
III. WORK PRODUCT AND TACTICAL BEHAVIOR
I wish I could be utopian.18 However, it would not surprise me in
the least if the loss of work product immunity redirects rather than
eliminates lawyers' use of discovery for tactical purposes. Lawyers
will, as Professor Allen suggests, undoubtedly attempt to manipulate
the timing of investigations and the allocation of the costs of informa-
tion gathering.
None of this, however, is beyond the control of the court. Just as
the court now regulates discovery in ruling on work product claims,
with work product eliminated it could regulate tactical behavior.
Courts can, as they already do, enter discovery scheduling orders.
Courts can, as they already do, impose sanctions such as excluding
evidence for violating these orders. Courts can, as they already do
with experts, enter orders allocating costs. The tactical behavior may
not stop, but it can be addressed directly. The courts may need to
intervene, as they already do.
Without work product doctrine masking the issue, the court would
be deciding discovery disputes that come closer to the real source of
the dispute: who will investigate? when must it be done? who pays?
This is far preferable to deciding those same disputes in the guise of
rulings about the application and scope of work product immunity. If
our concerns are about costs and free riders, we should argue about
costs and free riders, not about "anticipation of litigation." If our
concerns are about harassment, we should argue about harassment,
16 Id. at 1550-71.
17 Id. at 1571-73.
Is Allen, supra note 2, at 952. In response to this particular claim of utopian tendencies, I
do not claim that it is unseemly to appropriate an opponent's work product. Rather, I claim
that it is foolish and ineffective to base a case solely on an opponent's work product without
also doing independent preparation of one's own. Also, to the extent that Professor Allen is
adopting the "sharp practices" argument here, see Thornburg, supra note 1, at 1532-43.
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not about the scope of pure opinion work product. If our concerns
are about timing, we should argue about timing, not about the differ-
ence between discovery orders and pretrial orders. This is not replac-
ing private incentives with government regulation. 19 This is replacing
regulation that uses surrogate factors (the parameters of the work
product doctrine) with regulation that more directly addresses the
reasons for the parties' disputes.
CONCLUSION
In some ways, Professor Allen and I do not disagree. I agree20 that
in theory there can in some cases be a marginal increase in incentive
to investigate because of the work product immunity's ability to
increase an opponent's costs. I believe this marginal increase to be
insignificant while Professor Allen believes it to be more important.
Our disagreement here stems primarily from different assumptions
about how lawyers preparing for trial behave. Unlike Professor
Allen, I believe further that any benefit the marginal increase can gen-
erate is small and is outweighed by its cost. The elimination of work
product immunity from the arsenal of the discovery wars would not
create a perfect world, 21 but it would produce a better one. I remain
convinced that even from an economic perspective, the work product
immunity must go.
19 Allen, supra note 2, at 952 n. 11. Litigation activity is hardly a free market. The very
existence of the lawsuit depends on government compulsion to appear and answer. Likewise, a
party's need to respond to an opponent's discovery requests exists only because the courts can
compel compliance with the discovery rules. A shift in the enforcement mechanism may
change the context of the regulation, but it does not introduce regulation for the first time.
20 1 also agreed in my original article. Thornburg, supra note 1, at 1549.
21 Cf. Allen, supra note 2, at 955.
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